Abstract

In this dissertation, I explore the relation between language and thought. I criticize theories that explain the representational dimension of language in terms of the representational dimension of thought. I also investigate the prospects for theories that treat neither thought nor language as explanatorily prior to the other. ;The first chapter, "The Diversity of Representational Content," examines one of the most important arguments for treating thought as explanatorily prior to language. Many creatures seemingly lack language while manifesting serious cognitive activity. These examples of non-linguistic cognition apparently favor treating thought as explanatorily prior to language. In response to this argument, I urge that non-linguistic creatures display proto-thought rather than genuine thought. Genuine thought involves propositional content, while proto-thought involves different types of representational content. Once we distinguish proto-thought from genuine thought, we can maintain that genuine thought intimately involves language even though proto-thought does not. ;In the next two chapters, "The Norms of Reasoned Discourse" and "Why Should I Speak the Truth?", I develop a theory of assertion. I argue that assertion falls under irreducibly linguistic norms: the norms of reasoned discourse. When speakers violate these norms, they cease to reason correctly with one another. ;In the final chapter, "The Code Conception of Language," I deploy my theory of assertion against the conception of language propounded by Paul Grice and David Lewis. Grice and Lewis hold that sentences inherit content from the thoughts they communicate. For instance, a simplified form of the view holds that the sentence "Frank is hungry" inherits content from the belief that Frank is hungry because it serves to transmit that belief. This approach, which currently enjoys widespread popularity, treats thought as explanatorily prior to language. I argue that the approach ignores the norms of reasoned discourse and therefore enshrines a false theory of assertion