Evidentiating Free Will

Journal of Speculative Philosophy 28 (1):79-106 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The idea is nowadays current that recent work in neurophysiology strongly counterindicates the doctrine of free will. The present piece seeks to exhibit the incorrectness of this view.

Other Versions

reprint Rescher, Nicholas (2014) "3. Evidentiating Free Will". In Rescher, Nicholas, Philosophical Progress: And Other Philosophical Studies, pp. 44-71: De Gruyter (2014)

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,748

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-25

Downloads
22 (#1,046,814)

6 months
3 (#1,148,921)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Beyond Fredom and Dignity.B. F. Skinner - 1973 - Science and Society 37 (2):227-229.
Preface by.Daniel Wegner - 2002 - In The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Elbow Room: The Varities of Free Will worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):408-412.

View all 7 references / Add more references