Abstract

Questions about the meaning of life are widely assumed to be much older than the phrase itself. Many philosophers see nothing anachronistic, for instance, in talking about Aristotle's view on the meaning of life or looking to Ecclesiastes for evidence of what makes life meaningless, though neither Aristotle nor Ecclesiastes mentions meaning or meaninglessness as such. On this common way of thinking, nothing very philosophically important hangs on the fact that we now attach the term meaning to the idea. So, it's no real surprise that the question of when and why meaning ever came to be used in this way has received little attention among philosophers. For those who think it deserves more, Steven Cassedy's new book What Do We Mean When We Talk About Meaning? will be welcome. Though it may not be obvious from the title, which to a philosopher is likely to signal a theory or conceptual analysis of meaning, the book is in fact an historical study of the word meaning (and close synonyms thereof) as used in connection with the term life (and close synonyms thereof). According to Cassedy, the book's aim is to explain how a word that ‘fundamentally has to do with signs, words, stories, and other things that, well, mean or signify something’ (p. 4) came to acquire its modern-day ‘metaphysical’ sense—i.e., that sense in which it is now used to gesture portentously toward something like the purpose or value of life. The book's focus on the language of meaning distinguishes it from the type of historical approach found, for example, in Michael Ruse's On Purpose, which tracks the history of some metaphysical idea associated with the term (teleology in Ruse's case) rather than the term itself. Indeed, in this respect, Cassedy's book may be the first of its kind.