On 'Defending The Phenomenal Concept Strategy'

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):347-351 (2010)
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Abstract

I argue that Diaz-Leon fails to defend the phenomenal concept strategy against Stoljar's criticism because she fails to give us any general reasons for thinking that conditionals that involve psychologically distinct concepts could be a priori

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10.1080/00048400903133862

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References found in this work

What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.
Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.
Qualia, Properties, Modality.Brian Loar - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):113-129.
Defending the phenomenal concept strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.

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