Morality and sensibility in Kant: Toward a theory of virtue

Kantian Review 8:89-114 (2004)
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Abstract

… an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that no transition from the sensible to the supersensible is possible, just as if they were two different worlds

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Jamie Reid
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

Rational Feelings and Moral Agency.Ido Geiger - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308.
Kant’s Quasi‐Eudaimonism.Erica A. Holberg - 2018 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):317-341.
Kantian virtue.Anne Margaret Baxley - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):396–410.
The Importance of Pleasure in the Moral for Kant's Ethics.Erica A. Holberg - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):226-246.
Kantian Virtue.Annemargaret Baxley - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):396-410.

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References found in this work

Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.Price Charlson - 1960 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (1):109-110.
Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings.Daniel Breazeale - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):396-398.
The Value of Agency. [REVIEW]Paul Guyer - 1993 - Ethics 106 (2):404-423.

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