Abstract

I argue that 'Empathy' is of considerable value in ethical theory and reasoning. In Part One, I explain the concept I refer to as 'Empathy', taking as my starting point Jonathan Bennett's article, 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn'. I argue that a focus on Empathy, rather than sympathy, can better explain our intuitive ethical evaluations of the characters Bennett considers. I briefly discuss various interpretations of the traditional distinction between reason and emotion. With respect to the ethical realm, I cast doubt on two of these---the distinctions between feeling and reasoning, and between reasons and emotions/feelings. Part Two further explains an Empathic ethical approach, considers various potential objections and compares some alternatives. I discuss 'feminine' theories, such as Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings', which focus on care and the ethical importance of emotional capacities. These are sometimes proposed as alternatives to theories based on values such as autonomy, justice or rights. I agree that the development, and exercise, of emotional capacities are essential to moral agency. I argue, however, that critical capacities are equally essential; and that theories which neglect their importance are deeply flawed. I then compare my view with Stephen Darwall's discussion of 'sympathetic concern' and Douglas Chisinar's claims about 'empathy'. I conclude the second part by summarising the concept of Empathy and inferring that an Empathic agent is an Empathically ethically autonomous agent. In Part Three, I explore this relation between Empathy and ethical autonomy. Traditional conceptions of autonomy regard the emotional as an irrelevance, if not a positive impediment. I argue that Empathic ethical autonomy avoids some of the problems faced by the traditional one, while nonetheless recognising its value. I begin with Thomas E. Hill, Jr.'s discussion of autonomy and compassion, and suggest that these can be better integrated by an Empathic approach. Finally, I consider the challenges Marilyn Friedman identifies for feminist ethical theories which try to acknowledge the value of autonomy while rejecting overly individualistic conceptions of the self. I suggest that developing an Empathic Ethical Theory may offer one promising way to meet these challenges