How would you answer this question? Can dispositional analyses of belief account for first-person authority?

Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):204-219 (2022)
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Abstract

In the last decade, various analyses of beliefs in terms of dispositions have been advanced. One principled objection against dispositional accounts of belief is that they cannot accommodate first-...

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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):515-519.
Three theses about dispositions.Elizabeth W. Prior, Robert Pargetter & Frank Jackson - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257.

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