Abstract

I hope to point the way beyond man-centered morality. This man-centeredness is the species-centeredness or anthropocentrism and the male-centeredness or androcentrism of traditional Western morality, with roots in Judeo-Christian tradition and Greek philosophy. My thesis is that man-centeredness is not a mere orientation but a prejudice distorting, at level one, perceptions of who qualifies as a moral patient , at level two, moral decision theory, theory of good, indeed, the very conception of morality's task. We find at level one an obvious anthropocentric and a less obvious androcentrism, at level two an androcentrism only recently recognized. I shall focus on level one. ;An obvious solution to the scope question is generally assumed: all human but no nonhuman animals are proper moral patients. I challenge this "species line." Against anthropocentric morality, I argue that most animals ought to be intrinsically, therefore morally valued. Further, at the earliest stages of gestation fetuses are not moral patients, although such status emerges and strengthens with gestational development. Against androcentric morality, I argue that pregnant women are intrinsically valuable individuals first and primarily, not merely "mothers," receptacles in which a fetus grows. To give birth to a child is a gift, not a woman's duty or defining function. ;The scope issue ought to be a central rather than a side or derivative issue; traditional moral theory fails to understand the proper focus of morality, the just promotion of respect for the intrinsic value of individual sentient beings. This leads to moral individualism, intended to avoid obvious speciesism, latent sexism and other stereotyping that blinds moral agents to individuals qua individuals. With the species and male biases in place judgments about treatment of fetuses and research animals may seem consistent and morally adequate. Upon reexamination of the scope issue, however, such judgments are often revealed to be inconsistent and improperly "justified." ;Finally, even if we were to agree to extend moral patienthood to some animals and fetuses, this is just the beginning of the moral challenges we would face