Abstract

WITTGENSTEIN ON HYPOTHESIS AND NATURAL LAWS: A CONSIDERATION ABOUT THE ONTOLOGICAL TASK OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES In the critical literature with analytical orientation it is well-established the thesis that Wittgenstein has never abandoned, even in the last stages of his thought, a rigidly verificationist conception of the scientific method, underestimating the role of theoretical reasons in science and the plausibility of scientific realism. According to this image, Wittgenstein would have a too restrictive epistemology that would define natural science as an activity focused on observation, empirical verification and experimentation on the model of experimental physics and with a close bond with engineering. The purpose of this article is to refuse this image by developing two theoretical paths: on the one hand showing the complexity of Wittgenstein’s reflections about the sense of scientific propositions and especially the use of models in science and physics, on the other hand to problematize the thesis according to Wittgenstein’s reflections would exclude the possibility of postulating unobservable entities or using theoretical models in reflection on science. This article would like to be a contribution both for the rehabilitation of Wittgenstein’s reflection on science and for a general reflection on the ontological commitment of scientific theories.