Conceptions of truth in intuitionism

History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):131--45 (2004)
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Abstract

Intuitionism’s disagreement with classical logic is standardly based on its specific understanding of truth. But different intuitionists have actually explicated the notion of truth in fundamentally different ways. These are considered systematically and separately, and evaluated critically. It is argued that each account faces difficult problems. They all either have implausible consequences or are viciously circular.

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Panu Raatikainen
Tampere University

References found in this work

Elements of Intuitionism.Michael Dummett - 1977 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Roberto Minio.
Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
Frege.Michael Dummett - 1975 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):149-188.
Intuitionism.Arend Heyting - 1956 - Amsterdam,: North-Holland Pub. Co..
Phenomenalism.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 60-105.

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