Becoming closer to one another: Shared emotions and social relationships

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Many authors acknowledge that people share emotions in various social contexts. However, the deeper role of social relationships for shared emotions is poorly understood. I argue that shared emotions are affected by the social relationships in which they emerge. Moreover, shared emotions help people to bond. In order to do so, emotional experiences involve an intentional component that tracks the state of our social relationships. I introduce some new terminology that helps us to clearly distinguish between different kinds of emotional phenomena. I propose to use the term social-relational emotions for emotions the subcomponents of which interact across individuals. I borrow from Helm the distinction between the target, the formal object and the focus of an emotion. By drawing insights from relationship science in general and relational models theory in particular, I elaborate on and explore the idea that shared emotions track social relationships as their foci. Sharing an emotion is experienced as rewarding even when the shared emotion itself is not a pleasant one, because it makes people feel “closer” to one another.

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References found in this work

Merleau-Ponty on shared emotions and the joint ownership thesis.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):509-531.
The Nature of Sympathy.Max Scheler, Peter Heath & W. Stark - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (4):671-673.
Plural self-awareness.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.

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