Intuitions about large number cases

Analysis 73 (1):37-46 (2013)
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Abstract

Is there some large number of very mild hangnail pains, each experienced by a separate person, which would be worse than two years of excruciating torture, experienced by a single person? Many people have the intuition that the answer to this question is No. However, a host of philosophers have argued that, because we have no intuitive grasp of very large numbers, we should not trust such intuitions. I argue that there is decent intuitive support for the No answer, which does not depend on our intuitively grasping or imagining very large numbers

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Theron Pummer
University of St. Andrews

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References found in this work

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Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
In defence of repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.

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