The A-theory of time and induction

Philosophical Studies 152 (3):335 - 345 (2011)
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Abstract

The A-theory of time says that it is an objective, non-perspectival fact about the world that some events are present, while others were present or will be present. I shall argue that the A-theory has some implausible consequences for inductive reasoning. In particular, the presentist version of the A-theory, which holds that the difference between the present and the non-present consists in the present events being the only ones that exist, is very much in trouble

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Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

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References found in this work

Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.
Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future.Thomas G. Belt - 2006 - Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):432-459.

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