Probability, Regularity, and Cardinality

Philosophy of Science 80 (2):231-240 (2013)
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Abstract

Regularity is the thesis that all contingent propositions should be assigned probabilities strictly between zero and one. I will prove on cardinality grounds that if the domain is large enough, a regular probability assignment is impossible, even if we expand the range of values that probabilities can take, including, for instance, hyperreal values, and significantly weaken the axioms of probability.

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Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

Citations of this work

Infinitesimal Probabilities.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):509-552.
Infinitesimal Probabilities.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg, The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 199-265.
Declarations of independence.Branden Fitelson & Alan Hájek - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3979-3995.
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1940 - Philosophy of Science 7 (2):263-264.
Probability and conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Coherence and the axioms of confirmation.Abner Shimony - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):1-28.

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