Abstract

In this dissertation I attempt to defend the thesis that states may be regarded as subjects of right and, therefore, as ethical beings; that the first principle of the moral code of states cannot be different from the first principle of the moral code of persons; that there are, nevertheless, certain cases in the relations of states which have no parallel whatsoever in the relations of persons; that to this extent the code of state behavior will show differences from that for persons. The two principal points are that rights are relational and that states are ethical beings. Concerning William Ernest Hocking's definitive positive contribution to the subject of rights, we come to the realization that both of the principal points should be given equal prominence. ;In order to defend and to provide the rationale to defend the thesis, I try to explain why, in Hocking's view, certain ways of thinking about rights are indefensible. I distinguish between interests and rights. This is a critical point because the whole business of self-interest, so central since Adam Smith, seems easily confused with rights. I introduce the theme of rights/duties as a decisive one for the position taken by Hocking, who insists that rights are determined only relationally in a social context requiring duties as their corollary. I show loss of rights without foundations, specifically, loss of rights without God as a foundation, to be of major concern. ;I show why on certain grounds Hocking would not extend rights to certain persons, i.e., those individuals who exhibit no good will in dealing with others. I analyze Hocking's philosophy of right and theoretical framework relevant to rights, which is needed to determine whether the conditions of its use are present in the relations between individuals and the state, and between states. While my project is primarily expositional, I claim that Hocking's position is both sound and pertinent to contemporary discussions of rights