Respect for the dead and dying

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (4):409-416 (1984)
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Abstract

Against the thesis that permanently unconscious persons cannot be harmed, and thus are not owed moral deference, it is argued that even the dead can be harmed and are owed moral respect, so a fortiori those dubiously or not quite dead deserve some moral deference. Keywords: former person, right, euthanasia, comatose, personhood CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

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10.1093/jmp/9.4.409

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Anthony Preus
State University of New York at Binghamton

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