Abstract

In this dissertation I argue that it is with the notion of Be-wegung that Heidegger most radically thinks the essence of language. In his reading of Aristotle, Heidegger argues that showing binds together the most primordial elements of language. I expand on Heidegger's analysis by arguing that a distinction between sign and symbol in Aristotle requires a rethinking of the sign as withdrawal, a withdrawal set into play by means of Be-wegung. In the second chapter, I distinguish between Heidegger's notion of essence and Hegel's. I argue that Heidegger's account of the historical thinking of essence is strikingly similar to that of Hegel, but that the two thinkers radically differ in their departure from that history. In chapter three I show Heidegger's steadfastness in thinking the essence of language on its own terms, rather than as a determination made from the vantage point of human language. In chapter four I argue that a thinking of language requires a renunciation by language and a displacement of human beings from the proper sphere of language, though it is a renunciation and a displacement that grant language to human beings. In chapter five I argue that the Be-wegung of language requires a different conception of time and space, a conception inherent but unthought in Heidegger's earlier account of those issues