Moral and Epistemic Virtues: A Thomistic and Analytical Perspective

Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (1):1-15 (2010)
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Abstract

The article elaborates on the concept of ethics, noting the contrasting definitions of morality virtue-based and rule-based ethics. It highlights the related distinction between virtue epistemology and rule epistemology, stating that the main difference lies in the appreciation of the ethics of belief by either discipline. It also discusses the claim by philosopher Linda Zagzebski that epistemology is a branch of ethics, focusing on the contrary arguments including the perspectives of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

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Roger Pouivet
Université de Lorraine

References found in this work

“Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?Roderick Firth - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 215-229.

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