McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction

Utilitas 13 (3):350-356 (2001)
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Abstract

In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem

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2009-06-20

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Douglas W. Portmore
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Distinguishing agent-relativity from agent-neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250.
Reasons for action: Agent-neutral vs. Agent-relative.Michael Ridge - 2011 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Agent-Relativity and the Foundations of Moral Theory.Matthew Hammerton - 2017 - Dissertation, Australian National University

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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