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Kantianism versus Utilitarianism
Abstract
I argue that Kantianism and utilitarianism have the opposite strengths and weaknesses. Whereas Kantianism but not utilitarianism accords with our commonsense views about morality, utilitarianism but not Kantianism accords with our commonsense views about action and reasons for action.Author's Profile
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Similar books and articles
The Common Structure of Kantianism and Act-Utilitarianism.Christopher Woodard - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):246-265.
Friendship, virtue, and impartiality.Diane Jeske - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):51-72.
Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
A Test of ‘Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People’.David Wendler - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):473-499.
Dual-ranking act-consequentialism.Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):409 - 427.
Prescriptions and universalizability: a defence of Harean ethical theory.Daniel Y. Elstein - 2014 - Dissertation, Cambridge University
The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism.Ben Eggleston & Dale E. Miller (eds.) - 2014 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
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2023-06-28
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Author's Profile
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