The Myth of the Framework

In Joseph C. Pitt & Marcello Pera (eds.), Rational Changes in Science. Essays on Scientific Reasoning: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 98. Dordrecht: pp. 35-62 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,667

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-04-06

Downloads
52 (#421,487)

6 months
9 (#504,609)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1061-1081.
Severe testing as a basic concept in a neyman–pearson philosophy of induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.
Epistemic relativism and the problem of the criterion.Howard Sankey - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):562-570.
Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - London and Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

View all 59 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references