Abstract

It is argued specifically in chapters 3 and 6 that the way in which the concept of rule has been formulated and used in all of these approaches is the major reason for its failure to adequately explain observed language behavior. In particular, the claim is made that the failure to include the language user's perception of his context, both linguistic and non-linguistic, in the formulation of language rules, must result in a model of linguistic behavior that is incomplete and inadequate, if we wish to understand linguistic behavior as a species of intentional action. ;In chapters 4 and 5, respectively, two particular approaches to the use of the notion of rules to explain language behavior are discussed in relative detail: Wittgenstein's language game analogy and Chomsky's transformational theory of grammar. The former is specifically criticized on the grounds that the role of rules in games, as opposed to the role of rules in language are sufficiently different to warrant a reexamination and subsequent rejection of the analogy. The particular argument presented against the transformational approach, on the other hand, is that the "rules" of transformational grammar do not, as Chomsky admits, and can not be part of a model of linguistic performance, as Chomsky opines. ;Arguments for and against the use of the notion rule of language in approaches to the understanding of linguistic phenomena are presented. It is emphasized that those supporting the claim that language is rule-structured behavior generally advance two major arguments for this approach: the notion of rule, as opposed to convention or regularity, allows the projection of an infinite number of potential utterances from a finite basis of experience; and the novelty of previously unheard and never before produced utterances, but which are understood, can be accounted for only in terms of rules. These arguments plus several others are discussed in chapters 2 and 6