Abstract

Philosophical doctrines are often devised as a response by their author to prevailing intellectual questions. There is little reason to suspect that the philosophy of Descartes is any exception. At the time of his work, skepticism was undergoing a popular resurgence. Although there have been some recent attempts to incorporate Descartes' aversion to skepticism into a coherent account, none have really followed this issue to its logical conclusion. ;The standard account of Descartes' validation of clear and distinct perception follows the Meditations' order of exposition. As a result, it emphasizes Descartes' "order of reasons" over his skeptical concerns. In essence, his appeal to the utility of doubt is cast as a mere means to the fulfillment of his goal. Instead, natural light and intuition play a fundamental role while doubt is simply a tool that is subsequently discarded. ;This reading rests upon several basic and questionable assumptions stemming from three implicit presuppositions: the priority of the Meditations, the essential role of the cogito, and the relative insignificance of the doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths. ;I submit that contrary to this interpretation, Descartes' comments, correspondence, and most importantly, his arguments reflect the influence of skepticism. He accepts the skeptic's challenge, seeking to justify the reliability of clear and distinct perception. I contend that he allows systematic doubt its broadest scope, arguing that even under this extreme condition, undeniable certainties emerge. ;Turning to the specifics of his argument, I maintain that Descartes consistently employs two notions of clear and distinct perception: One prior to the proof of God's existence and a significantly different one afterwards. The first involves possibilities and serves as the basis for the ontological proof. God's existence and veracity assure the truth of clear and distinct perception, thus yielding the second notion. Unlike the standard account, this interpretation relies solely upon the implications of systematic doubt rather than the questionable incorrigibility of natural light and intuition. As a result, the goal is achieved and circularity avoided