Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (9):2847-2873 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One important activity in conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering involves proposing to associate a new semantics with an existing word. Many philosophers think that one important way to evaluate such a proposal concerns whether it preserves the “topic” picked out by the existing word, and several have offered competing proposals concerning what is required to preserve topic. Our paper is focused on the conceptual ethics question of how conceptual engineers should use the term ‘topic continuity’. We provide and defend a context-sensitive answer to this question. Our answer is motivated by the idea that there are several distinct considerations that we can reasonably care about (and which many conceptual engineers already do care about) in thinking about “topic continuity”, and, moreover, that how best to weigh them against each other can vary from context to context. On our proposal, ‘topic continuity’ can function as a useful representational device that enables coordination by inquirers with respect to these concerns. We conclude by locating our account in a broader way of thinking about topic continuity across a range of inquiries.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,388

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-01-12

Downloads
128 (#175,542)

6 months
19 (#140,303)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

David Plunkett
Dartmouth College
Tristram McPherson
Ohio State University

References found in this work

Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

View all 25 references / Add more references