Against Spontaneity: The Act as Over-Censorship in Badiou, Lacan, and Žižek
Abstract
Recent discussions of the notion of the act in Lacan and Žižek have made the act out to be something like a stand in for the old idea of freedom. And so, the debate tends to be about whether acts are spontaneous or not, whether they result from decisions coming from a conscious subject or not, and what relation acts have to the circumstances that precede them. But much of this debate may be a red herring. I will be taking the view here that, despite important similarities, the major difference between Badiou and Žižek on this point can be traced back to their differing views on the subject. By thinking the subject as a void, or as negative, Žižek’s subject looks more like a decisionist, even Sartrean subject. Badiou’s subject seems more fully post-phenomenological, and this difference has an important effect on how the act is conceived in his work.How Badiou’s subject fits within a psychoanalytic perspective is something I will explore in my second part. Badiou’s theory seems to have taken a psychoanalytic and Lacanian perspective very much to heart when thinking about the act. I will explain how this is so by using two models for an act coming from two different artistic practices: the surrealist practice of automatic writing, which I will compare to psychoanalytic free association, and the practice that Marcel Duchamp dubbed “over-censorship,” which I will compare to “working-through”. Each gives us a different model for the production of truth, and, in line with Badiou’s call to become the “pitiless censors of ourselves,” I argue that Duchamp’s technique has quite a bit to teach us about the structure of an act. It also helps to shed light on some aspects of Žižek’s view