On Understanding ‘Probably’ and Other Modal Qualifiers

Abstract

An examination of several approaches to the force of ‘probably’, when used to qualify the conclusions of arguments and inferences. Among the views examined are those of Toulmin and Wilfrid Sellars. The paper recommends taking the utterance of “Probably p’ to be licensing or authorizing the adoption of a particular doxastic attitude toward p, and offers a functional account of that particular doxastic attitude, namely expecting that p will turn out to be the case.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,551

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.
Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.
The Case for Rational Uniqueness.Jonathan Matheson - 2011 - Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.
Can Fictionalists Have Faith?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (2):215-232.
No, one should not believe all truths.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1091-1103.
Rational Inquiry, Suspension, and Stability.Alexandra Zinke - 2025 - In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra (eds.), Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge.
The logic of probabilistic knowledge.Patricia Rich - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1703-1725.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-02

Downloads
12 (#1,373,211)

6 months
1 (#1,889,092)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?