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On Batterman's 'On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science'
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):211 - 217 (2011)
Abstract
This discussion note of (Batterman [2010]) clarifies the modest aims of my 'mapping account' of applications of mathematics in science. Once these aims are clarified it becomes clear that Batterman's 'completely new approach' (Batterman [2010], p. 24) is not needed to make sense of his cases of idealized mathematical explanations. Instead, a positive proposal for the explanatory power of such cases can be reconciled with the mapping account.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Explanatory Abstractions.Lina Jansson & Juha Saatsi - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):817–844.
On the ‘Indispensable Explanatory Role’ of Mathematics.Juha Saatsi - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1045-1070.
The Propensity Interpretation of Probability: A Re-evaluation.Joseph Berkovitz - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (S3):629-711.
On the epistemological significance of the hungarian project.Michèle Friend - 2015 - Synthese 192 (7):2035-2051.
References found in this work
An Inferential Conception of the Application of Mathematics.Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):345-374.
On the explanatory role of mathematics in empirical science.Robert W. Batterman - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):1-25.
A new perspective on the problem of applying mathematics.Christopher Pincock - 2004 - Philosophia Mathematica 12 (2):135-161.
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