Investigating the Shared Background Required for Argument: A Critique of Fogelin’s Thesis on Deep Disagreement

Informal Logic 28 (2):86-101 (2008)
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Abstract

Robert Fogelin claims that interlocutors must share a framework of background beliefs and commitments in order to fruitfully pursue argument. I refute Fogelin’s claim by investigating more thoroughly the shared background required for productive argument. I find that this background consists not in any common beliefs regarding the topic at hand, but rather in certain shared pro-cedural commitments and competencies. I suggest that Fogelin and his supporters mistakenly view shared beliefs as part of the required background for productive argument because these procedural com-mitments become more difficult to uphold when people’s beliefs diverge widely regarding the topic at hand

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References found in this work

The web of belief.Willard Van Orman Quine & J. S. Ullian - 1970 - New York,: Random House. Edited by J. S. Ullian.
The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.
Practical Reasoning About Final Ends.Henry S. Richardson - 1994 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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