Gert, Sidgwick, and hybrid theories of rationality

Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (4):439-448 (2001)
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Abstract

Hybrid theories of rationality of the sort developed by Bernard Gert have significant attractions. I argue, though, that Gert's is not the only way to formulate a hybrid view, and not the best. An improved hybrid view would draw on Sidgwick as well as on Gert.

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10.1023/a:1013771726466

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David Phillips
University of Houston

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