The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X

Noûs 52 (2):336-372 (2018)
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Abstract

Consider Phoebe and Daphne. Phoebe has credences in 1 million propositions. Daphne, on the other hand, has credences in all of these propositions, but she's also got credences in 999 million other propositions. Phoebe's credences are all very accurate. Each of Daphne's credences, in contrast, are not very accurate at all; each is a little more accurate than it is inaccurate, but not by much. Whose doxastic state is better, Phoebe's or Daphne's? It is clear that this question is analogous to a question that has exercised ethicists over the past thirty years. How do we weigh a population consisting of some number of exceptionally happy and satisfied individuals against another population consisting of a much greater number of people whose lives are only just worth living? This is the question that occasions population ethics. In this paper, I go in search of the correct population ethics for credal states.

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Richard Pettigrew
University of Bristol

Citations of this work

Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.
Asymmetries of Value-Based Reasons.Philip Li - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Imprecise Epistemic Values and Imprecise Credences.B. A. Levinstein - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):741-760.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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