Abstract

The kalon, the fine or the beautiful, is a fundamental concept in the Greek moral vocabulary. In Plato's dialogues, we find a systematic connection of the kalon with the agathon, the good, such that it is often inferred from the assumption that something is kalon that it is good or beneficial in a non-moral sense. This relationship lies at the heart of Plato's ethics in that it is fundamental to his argument that we benefit from being virtuous. ;The questions I address are: what does Plato mean by calling something kalon, why does he believe that what is kalon is also agathon, and why does he most often treat this relationship as axiomatic? I look at what the Greeks traditionally understand by the kalon through a survey of the literature from Homer to the end of the fifth century, and I trace the development of Plato's thinking about the kalon and the agathon in the Socratic dialogues, emphasizing the Gorgias and the Hippias Major. ;The thesis I argue for is that, underlying judgments of what is kalon, there are more fundamental judgments of what is agathon. Socrates' interlocutors are almost always willing to admit that what is kalon is agathon because they share his assumption that what makes something kalon is that it is agathon in some sense or another. ;Of course, there are disagreements about what is agathon and, in particular, about what the good for humans or the good life is, creating conflicting opinions about what is kalon. The crucial case is that of the virtues because these are kala to the extent to which they contribute to living a good life and being a good person. This relationship between what makes virtue kala and one's conception of the good for humans is a constant theme from Homer to Plato. In so far as Plato has a different, Socratic, notion of the good for humans, his conception of the kalon and its relationship with the agathon is both a continuation of and a departure from a well-established pattern in Greek moral beliefs