Reflecting Ricœur’s Saying: „It is not the Brain, What Thinks, It is me.“

Filozofia 62:413-421 (2007)
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Abstract

I wish to come back to the „failed dialogue“ between Changeux and Ricœur in order to understand better what is the difficulty in the relation between neurosciences and phenomenology. Is this apparent difficulty real, and in that case, should it be conside- red insurmountable? Long before there was talk of „cognitive neurosciences“, the Voluntary and the Involuntary opened up the perspective of the phenomenology of action that was overcome over in the hermeneutical orientation of Ricœur’s later works. The relaunching of the phenomenology of action might contribute to the elucidation of neurosciences and cognitive sciences by recalling the intuitions of phenomenology of the own body and empathy. This is a new occasion to verify how far teaching of our master Ricœur is fruitful even beyond his own domain

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