Abstract

This dissertation seeks to identify an ethical principle that is both pragmatic and theistic. If successful, it will present an interpretation of pragmatism that is different in significant respects from many current pragmatic or neo-pragmatic philosophies. Contrary to the neo-pragmatism of figures such as Richard Rorty or Cornell West, I argue that pragmatism offers a critical conception of the good, that is, an understanding of the good that is more than a mere "vocabulary" or method of criticism. In opposition to some Dewey scholars who find Dewey's commitment to democracy to be gratuitous to his pragmatism, I argue that the democratic ideal is a transcendental commitment of pragmatism; that is, pragmatic inquiry necessarily implies the democratic ideal. Furthermore, contrary to the dominant humanistic reading of pragmatism, I contend that only a theistic understanding of pragmatism can be successful. I also argue that this theism must be pragmatically justified, and so take issue with theistic corrections of Dewey's thought, such as offered by Steven Rockefeller, that I take to be anti-pragmatic in character. Against the so-called "radical empiricism" of some who find their pragmatic roots in the writings of William James, such as Nancy Frankenberry, Jerome Stone, and William Dean, I argue that the metaphysics that lies at the heart of Dewey's pragmatism must be non-empirically validated, and I defend this position by appeal to Dewey's own logical writings. In the last decade, there has been a significant revival of interest in Dewey's writings. The importance of pragmatism to questions in moral philosophy and philosophy of religion remains widely discussed as this century draws to a close, even as it was when the century opened. I consider this dissertation to be a contribution to this discussion, a contribution that at least has the merit of offering a significantly different interpretation of pragmatism from those currently available