Epistemic Self-Trust and Doxastic Disagreements

Erkenntnis 84 (6):1189-1205 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational response question: how are you rationally required to respond to a doxastic disagreement with someone, especially with someone you take to be your epistemic peer? A doxastic disagreement with someone also confronts you with a slightly different question. This question, call it the epistemic trust question, is: how much should you trust our own epistemic faculties relative to the epistemic faculties of others? Answering the epistemic trust question is important for the epistemology of disagreement because it sheds light on the rational response question. My main aim in this paper is to argue—against recent attempts to show otherwise—that epistemic self-trust does not provide a reason for remaining steadfast in doxastic disagreements with others.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-04-19

Downloads
174 (#140,141)

6 months
17 (#151,358)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Fabienne Peter
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.
The Epistemology of Disagreement.Michel Croce - 2023 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Systemic Concept of Contextual Truth.Andrzej Bielecki - 2020 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):807-824.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

View all 42 references / Add more references