Durable goods: pleasure, wealth and power in the virtuous life

New York: Peter Lang Publishing (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ancient Greek philosophers generally accept the claim that εὐδαιμονία is within our power to achieve, regardless of circumstance. Conversely, external goods - physical health, education, social standing - are frequently present or absent due to circumstances beyond our control. Can eudaimonism explain how more than a privileged elite can attain εὐδαιμονία when so few enjoy the requisite external goods? <BR> A satisfactory account of the relation between external goods and well-being must accommodate both the insight that there is an essential connection between prosperity and the flourishing life and that there is a real sense in which εὐδαιμονία is a self-sufficient concept. The -applied intellectualist- interpretation of eudaimonism defended here accommodates important insights of several ancient Greek traditions: Aristotle's account of human nature, specifically the role of external goods as necessary preconditions for leading a human life; Socratic and Stoic analysis that external goods are necessary constituents of moral action; and Plato's commitment to a criterion for judging the compatibility of external prosperity with a life of εὐδαιμονία. <BR> This text provides a comprehensive linguistic and ethical analysis of key terms and arguments across several centuries of ancient Greek ethical thought on this fascinating topic, making it an excellent foundation for an upper-division undergraduate seminar in ancient Greek ethics, virtue ethics, or applied ethics."

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,854

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-02-24

Downloads
10 (#1,481,570)

6 months
3 (#1,491,886)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references