Abstract

The paper examines Jacques Rancière’s critique of Hannah Arendt, whom he considers as a proponent of liberal political philosophy. The fact that he finds in Arendt an advocate of the liberal, even conservative fixation of the borderline between the private and the public sphere and at the same time oversees her insistence on what he would call ‘dissenting’ politics – particularly her notions of beginning and revolution – demands the uncovering of possible tacit reasons of his rebuttal of Arendt. In the center is the axis to which their two seemingly irreconcilable political-theoretical edifices are bound, around which they ‘twist’ and, although separated, are even able to supplement each other: the axis of the private and public, i.e. of the social and political, and the notion of arché as its balance point. The assumption is that Rancière’s radical posture against Arendt prevents him to also learn something from her purportedly juxtaposed position. Moreover, it seems that Arendt’s political thought even offers solutions for paradoxes into which he maneuvers himself. Therefore, and contrary to Rancière’s own insistence on the irreconcilable differences between them, Hannah Arendt represents for Rancière’s political thinking a theoretical forefield that precedes his own work and even anticipates its critique.