Defending hard incompatibilism again

In Nick Trakakis & Daniel Cohen (eds.), Essays on free will and moral responsibility. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 1--33 (2008)
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Derk Pereboom
Cornell University

Citations of this work

In defence of the Four-Case Argument.Benjamin Matheson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1963-1982.
Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.
Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.
Hard incompatibilism and its rivals.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):21 - 33.
The Samaritan’s Curse: moral individuals and immoral groups.Kaushik Basu - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):132-151.

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