Thinking with the Cartesians and Speaking with the Vulgar: Extrinsic Denomination in the Philosophy of Antoine Arnauld

Journal of the History of Philosophy 60 (2):227-252 (2022)
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Abstract

Arnauld follows Descartes in denying that sensible qualities like color are modes of external objects. Yet, unlike Malebranche, he resists the apparent implication that ordinary statements like ‘this marble is white’ are false. Arnauld also follows Descartes in saying that we perceive things by having ideas of them. Yet, unlike Malebranche, he denies that this sort of talk implies the existence of intermediaries standing between the mind and its external objects. How can Arnauld avoid these implications? I argue that the answer lies in Arnauld’s sophisticated theory of mental and linguistic representation and, in particular, his account of extrinsic denomination.

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Kenneth L. Pearce
James Madison University

Citations of this work

Antoine Arnauld.Elmar Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

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L'analyse du langage à Port-Royal.Jean-Claude Pariente - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (4):527-528.

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