Rationale and maxims in the study of concepts

Noûs 39 (1):167-78 (2005)
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Abstract

Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.

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Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University

Citations of this work

Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Concepts as a working hypothesis.Samuel D. Taylor - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology (4):569-594.
Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.

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References found in this work

Logical Investigations.Edmund Husserl - 1970 - London, England: Routledge. Edited by Dermot Moran.
The realm of reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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