Abstract

The defining of 'image' as essentially that class of idea to which there is no object corresponding, springs from a commend able desire not to allow analysis to result in an incorrect conceptual multiplication of physical objects or situations. This result would be likely if the thinker succumbed to the temptation to consider that for every idea entertained there is somehow an objective physical situation corresponding. The simple calling of attention to the type of mental state signified by the word 'imagining' is reckoned to be sufficient to guard against this danger. And so it is. But at the same time,- concentration upon this danger may easily lead to the consequent temptation to consider that there are some ideas which have no objects of reference whatever. This is just not the case. The true insight that some ideas have no objective physical situations corresponding to them does not imply that some ideas have no objects of reference unless it be assumed that all situations or states of affairs are physical. But then if this is true there can be no specific meaning at all for the word 'idea' since by it we imply at the very least some distinction from the physical as such; and in this case all attempts to distinguish 'idea' as over against 'object' break down. The presence of this dilemma is enough to demand a re-analysis of the original distinction.