Bad Feelings Really are Bad: A Reply to Thomason

Philosophia:1-12 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Many of the world’s great wisdom traditions hold that human flourishing requires avoiding negative emotions such as anger, envy, spite, and jealousy. Thomason (2023) boldly challenges this received view. Whereas other negative emotion apologists advocate using reason to rein in our “bad feelings,” Thomason urges us to accept them just as they are. Her unqualified defense comprises two key arguments. The first draws on the idea that negative emotions are a necessary feature of healthy self-love—ceasing to feel them is tantamount to no longer caring about one’s life. The second argument points to an “emotion double standard” in which anger, envy, and other bad feelings are disparaged, while emotions such as joy and gratitude are praised, even though the same objections apply in both cases. Drawing on insights from social psychology and ancient philosophy, I aim to show that neither argument succeeds. One major weakness of these arguments is that they overlook features of negative emotions that seem intrinsically disvaluable such as hostility and self-centeredness. A second issue is that Thomason’s narrow conception of self-love gives a misleading impression regarding the necessity of bad feelings for a happy and healthy life. These criticisms notwithstanding, I conclude with a qualified endorsement of Thomason’s practical advice for living well with our emotions—an issue of perennial importance.

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Tyler Paytas
Australian Catholic University

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References found in this work

Rhetoric. Aristotle & C. D. C. Reeve - 2018 - Hackett Publishing Company.
The Aptness of Anger.Amia Srinivasan - 2017 - Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2):123-144.
Meekness and 'Moral' Anger.Glen Pettigrove - 2012 - Ethics 122 (2):341-370.
Aptness Isn’t Enough: Why We Ought to Abandon Anger.Tyler Paytas - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (5):743-759.
Sympathetic Joy.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3275-3285.

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