Abstract

BEING AND THOUGHT IN HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC: FROM TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM TO HEGEL’S METAPHYSICS. The aim of this article is to produce a portrait of the relationship between being and thought in Hegel's Science of Logic, in conjunction with understanding this relationship as a necessary key in order to frame its ambitions as either transcendental or ontological in scope. In a transcendental thesis, the categories are determinative functions of the form of self-consciousness as thought, while in the latter they are forms of thought but also of being. Our thesis assumes the fact that the first movement of the system is not the dialectical movement of being into nothingness and vice versa as becoming, but rather a transcendental deduction contained within the privileged relationship between logic and ontology without which the system cannot move as a metaphysical deduction. We have also found fecund to our endeavor the framing of the earlier mentioned problem in the larger history of German idealism, especially Kant, proposing a destructuring of the portrait of the identity of being and thought as it appears in the critical system around three main actors: the-thing-in-itself, the categories and their deduction.