The Argument From Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism

Oxford ;: Oxford University Press (2002)
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Abstract

Alexy confronts the legal positivist view in this classic work of legal philosophy. He formulates an accessible concept of law that systematically links classical elements of legal positivism with nonpositivistic legal theory, challenging the prevailing orthodoxies of modern jurisprudence.

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Citations of this work

Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - 2018 - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-86.

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