Intentionalism and perceptual presence

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541 (2007)
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Abstract

H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness

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10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00134.x

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Adam Pautz
Brown University

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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