Abstract

Sanford Goldberg has recently proposed a solution to the swamping problem for process reliabilist truth-monism (PRTM). In short, he argues that reliably formed true beliefs have a property he calls the ‘modal reliability property’, the epistemic value of which is explained in terms of the value of true belief but is not swamped by it. He offers two arguments to this effect. I claim that both of his arguments are valid, but they employ premisses the truth of which needs to be explained. However, it is not obvious how a proponent of PRTM could explain them without abandoning her preferred order of explanation. I do not argue that it is impossible in principle to discharge this burden. However, I do claim that Goldberg has yet to show us that it is possible. The result is that the swamping problem is no less problematic for PRTM than it was previously.