On the conceptual and the empirical (a critique of John Mikhail's cognitivism)

Abstract

Empirical claims are factual claims validated by the methods of science. Conceptual claims involve matters of sense. Empirical inquiry that proceeds from conceptual confusion can never yield fruitful results (i.e., knowledge). John Mikhail's speculations about UMG are an example of conceptual confusions that lead not to knowledge but to claims and assertions that lack sense.

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