Is the Concept of Freedom Essentially Contestable?

Philosophy 61 (235):116 - 123 (1986)
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Abstract

In 1956 W. B. Gallie advanced the thesis that certain political concepts, such as that of social justice, are .1 Since then, a considerable literature on the subject has developed, some of it in support of the thesis, some of it in opposition to it.2 W. E. Connolly is a leading supporter of it, and John Gray is a leading opponent of it. However, Connolly's advocacy of it in the second edition of his book is significantly more moderate than that in the first (1974) edition of it

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In Defence of Ubuntu.Moeketsi Letseka - 2011 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 31 (1):47-60.

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References found in this work

IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts.W. B. Gallie - 1956 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1):167-198.
Political Concepts: A Reconstruction.Felix E. Oppenheim - 1981 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):249-252.
Essays in Philosophical Analysis.Nicholas Rescher - 1969 - Foundations of Language 11 (3):471-476.

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