The subtraction argument(s)

Dialectica 60 (2):145–156 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The subtraction argument aims to show that there is an empty world, in the sense of a possible world with no concrete objects. The argument has been endorsed by several philosophers. I show that there are currently two versions of the argument around, and that only one of them is valid. I then sketch the main problem for the valid version of the argument

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,130

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
132 (#166,553)

6 months
10 (#398,493)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

A. C. Paseau
University of Oxford

References found in this work

Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.David Malet Armstrong - 1989 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.M. J. Cresswell - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):660.
There might be nothing.Thomas Baldwin - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):231-238.

View all 9 references / Add more references