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Why Successful Performance in Imagery Tasks Does not Require the Manipulation of Mental Imagery
Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (X):1-11 (2019)
Abstract
Nanay (2017) argues for unconscious mental imagery, inter alia based on the assumption that successful performance in imagery tasks requires the manipulation of mental imagery. I challenge this assumption with the help of results presented in Shepard and Metzler (1971), Zeman et al. (2010), and Keogh and Pearson (2018). The studies suggest that imagery tasks can be successfully performed by means of cognitive/propositional strategies which do not rely on imagery.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
Slower but more accurate mental rotation performance in aphantasia linked to differences in cognitive strategies.Lachlan Kay, Rebecca Keogh & Joel Pearson - 2024 - Consciousness and Cognition 121 (C):103694.
References found in this work
Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254.
Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
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