Abstract

Nina Emery has argued that when indeterministic law explains its instances, the law grounds its instances, and what does the grounding (put simply, a ground) does not necessitate what is grounded (put simply, a groundee), thereby challenging grounding necessitarianism. In contrast, Elanor Taylor has argued that such a counterexample to grounding necessitarianism actually rejects explanatory realism. Both cannot be true at the same time, and the question of which of the conclusions is correct is left open without further discussion. In this essay, I examine this question in the light of their arguments, with the aim of arguing against Taylor’s way toward rejecting explanatory realism. Taylor’s view that grounding necessitarianism is self-evident leads her to conclude that explanatory realism seems untenable. However, I challenge Taylor’s rejection of explanatory realism by arguing that the most fundamental rationale for viewing grounding necessitarianism as self-evident—that a ground is a complete metaphysical explanans of its groundee—does not align with that indeterministic laws explain their instances.